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Questions of Exclusion and Exception Under
Title VlI-"Sex-Plus" and the BFOQ
By JAMEs C. OLDHAM*
The fundamental law of the state, as embodied in its constitu-
tion, provides that "no person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law." . . . Under our laws men
and women now stand alike in their constitutional rights and there
is no warrant for making any discrimination between them with re-
spect to the liberty of person, or of contract. . . . [This] legisla-
tion cannot, and should not, be upheld as a proper exercise of the
police power. It is, certainly, discriminative against female citi-
zens, in denying to them equal rights with men in the same pursuit.
[Judge Gray, writing for the New York Court of Appeals in 1907.11
ENLIGHTENED words, those of Judge Gray-words with a familiar
ring to them, as if appearing in an advance sheet of just the other day.
The legislation invalidated by the New York Court was designed to re-
strict the employment of women to certain hours;2 it was a form of pro-
tective legislation intended to alleviate some of the untoward industrial
conditions to which women in the labor force were subjected in the
early part of this century.3
But Judge Gray was strangely out of joint in time. Only a year
later Louis Brandeis, representing the active feminist efforts of the Na-
tional Consumers League at the request of his sister-in-law, success-
fully defended before the United States Supreme Court an Oregon stat-
* B.S., 1962, Duke University; LL.B., 1965, Stanford University; M.S.B.A.,
1967, University of Denver; Assoc. Prof. and Ass't Dean, Georgetown University Law
Center; Member, Colorado Bar.
1. People v. Williams, 189 N.Y. 131, 134-35, 81 N.E. 778, 779-80 (1907).
2. The New York Labor Law which was declared unconstitutional provided:
"No minor under the age of 18 years, and no female shall be employed, permitted or
suffered to work in any factory in this state before six o'clock in the morning, or after
nine o'clock in the evening of any day .... ." Ch. 184, § 77 [1903] N.Y. Laws 439.
The court pointed out that "defendant's guilt was rested, solely, upon his failure to ob-
serve the provision of the statute against a female being at work after nine o'clock in
the evening." 189 N.Y. at 133, 81 N.E. at 779.
3. The conditions have been chronicled by many. E.g., G. BUTLER, WOMEN
Am THE TRADEs: PITrSBURGH 1907-08 (reprint ed. 1969).
ute placing maximum limits on the hours of work of women in industry.4
Opposing counsel argued that women possessed equally with men the
fundamental right of free contract-an argument which has been de-
scribed as the "dry bones of legalism" rattling in favor of a socially
unsound result.' Based as it was on the carefully documented realities
of industrial life of the time, the Muller decision was generally regarded
as a progressive victory in advancing the status of women.6
Since Muller, the movement to secure equality for women has been
episodic, languishing in particular during the 1920's.7 The drive to se-
cure an Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution has been
launched year after year without success' and the Supreme Court has not
acknowledged to date that sex discrimination is sufficiently invidious to
be proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment.'
Nevertheless, over the past decade there has been a new awaken-
ing. Legislation originally fashioned as that in Muller to protect women
and to advance their station has been challenged as outmoded and un-
4. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). This case is widely known as the
first significant instance in which a lawsuit was argued and won on the basis of nonlegal
(sociological and economic) proof, and marked the origin of the so-called "Brandeis
brief."
5. A. LIEF, BRANDEIS: THE PERSONAL HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN IDEAL 137
(1936). See A. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 245-53 (1946).
6. See BUTLER, supra note 3, at 351-57; Brandeis, The Living Law, 10 ILL.
L. REV. 461 (1916). There have been detractors from this view-those who argue that
the real impetus for protective legislation, even in the early 1900's, was an awareness
that such legislation would preserve work opportunities for males. See R. RIEGEL,
AMERICAN WOMEN 273-74 (1970); Dorsen & Ross, The Necessity of a Constitutional
Amendment, 6 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L REV. 216, 222-23 (1971).
7. For an instructive historical narrative see W. O'NEILL, THE WOMEN'S MOVE-
MENT (1969).
8. Hundreds of joint resolutions have been introduced in the Congress designed
to amend the constitution to secure equal rights for men and women. For a compila-
tion of those resolutions since 1923 see Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal
Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE
L.J. 871, 981-85 (1971). Victory has at times seemed near, especially in 1970. See id.
at 886-88. The 1971 hearings have also raised hopes for success. A proposed constitu-
tional amendment has passed the House. 117 CONG. REC. H9392 (daily ed. Oct. 12,
1971). It is now pending before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, along with several different versions of an equal rights
amendment. However, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (Dem.-N.C.) is mustering forces to
oppose the amendment in the event it cleais the Judiciary Committee. Washington Post,
Oct. 14, 1971, at 22, cols. 1 & 2.
9. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373
(1915); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Developments in the Law-Employ-
ment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV.
1109, 1192-93 n.119 (1971 ) [hereinafter cited as Developments-Title VII].
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constitutional."0 Likewise, the lamentably numerous other features of
American life which operate in discriminatory ways against women have
come under attack.1
The catalyst has been Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,12
the basic structure of which is by now familiar. Discrimination in em-
ployment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin con-
10. At least two recent cases have attacked such statutes as violative of the Four.
teenth Amendment. Mengelkoch v. Industrial Welfare Comm'n, 3 FAIR EMP. PRAc.
CAs. 55 (9th Cir. Jan. 11, 1971), modified, 3 FAIR EMP. PRAc. CAS. 471 (9th Cir. May
3, 1971); Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
As a rule, the challenges in the courts and in the treatises have taken the position that
protective legislation is no longer valid and should be stricken altogether. E.g., Pater-
son Tavern & Grill Owners Ass'n v. Borough of Hawthorne, 57 N.J. 180, 270 A.2d 628
(1970); Developments-Title VII, supra note 9, at 1191-94; Note, A Woman's Place:
Diminishing Justifications for Sex Discrimination in Employment, 42 So. CAL. L. REV.
183, 204 (1969). Contra, Jones Metal Prods. Co. v. Walker, 25 Ohio App. 2d 141, 267
N.E.2d 814 (1971).
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has adopted a similar stance with
regard to these protective statutes: "The commission believes that such state laws and
regulations, although originally promulgated for the purpose of protecting females, have
ceased to be relevant to our technology or to the expanding role of the female worker
in our economy. The commission has found that such laws do not take into account
the capacities, preferences, and abilities of individual females and tend to discriminate
rather than protect. Accordingly, the commission has concluded that such laws and
regulations conflict with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and will not be con-
sidered a defense to an otherwise established unlawful employment practice or as a basis
for the application of the bona fide occupational exception." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(b) (2)
(1971).
There have been some voices of moderation, however. For instance, the suggestion
has been made that state protective laws be extended to males wherever possible. L.
KANowrrz, WOMEN AND THE LAW 120 (1969); "Policy Statement on Women in the
Work Force" at 3-4, adopted by the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor Delegate
Meeting, Sept. 21, 1970. For a thoughtful study, pointing out the paucity of hard
data presented by opponents of protective legislation see Munts & Rice, Women Work-
ers: Protection or Equality? 24 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 3 (1970). This absence of data
is viewed by the authors as ironic in light of the origin of protective legislation in the
painstaking, documented efforts of Brandeis. Munts and Rice give one recent example
in Michigan of assembly line female employees who suffered considerably from a tem-
porary suspension of the maximum hours law. Id. at 9. For similar testimony given
by labor leaders see Hearings on H.J. Res. 35, 208 & Related Bills & H.R. 916 & Re-
lated Bills Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. ser. 2, at 212-28, 252-57 (1971) (testimony of Myra K. Wolfgang and Ruth
Miller). These examples may be isolated, but it might be helpful if those who advocate
wholesale elimination of protective laws could demonstrate specifically that those em-
ployees at whom the laws were largely directed in the first place would not be ad-
versely affected. Cf. Oldham, Sex Discrimination and State Protective Laws, 44 DEN-
vER L.J. 344 (1967).
11. See generally L. KANowrrz, WOMEN AND THE LAW (1969).
12. §§ 701-16, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1964).
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stitutes an unlawful employment practice."3 In cases involving actions
allegedly based on religion, sex or national origin, there is an exception
in the statute; discrimination is exonerated if the prohibited ground for
discrimination constitutes "a bona fide occupational qualification [bfoq]
reasonably necessary to the normal operation" of the employer's busi-
ness.' 4  The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
was formed to administer Title VII, although unfortunately the commis-
sion's powers were restricted to "conference, conciliation and persua-
sion."" Notwithstanding this handicap, the commission has accom-
plished a great deal in its five-year history, in large part through its
formulation of various sets of guidelines, publication of written deci-
sions, and, perhaps most significant, its appearance as amicus curiae in
most of the important litigation which has taken place under Title VII.' 6
The scope of Title VII is circumscribed by jurisdictional require-
ments and by its applicability only to employment relationships;7
13. Title VII § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
14. Title VII § 703(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
15. Title VII § 706(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a). The attorney general, under
§ 707 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a), can bring "pattern or practice" suits, and
individuals can sue if they so desire. Legislation designed to give the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission enforcement powers has been proposed each year since
1964, but without success. The current bill, H.R. 1746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971),
passed the House exclusive of cease and desist powers, but allowing the EEOC to go
to court to enforce its rulings. 117 CONG. REC. H8542 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1971). The
Senate version (which includes cease and desist powers) was reported by the Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare to the Senate on October 28, 1971. S. REP. No. 92-412,
92d Cong., lst Sess. (1971).
16. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 5TH ANNUAL REPORT
(1971). Of the commission's almost 1000 written decisions in fiscal year 1970, 115
have been published. Id. at 7. The commission participated as amicus curiae in 167
private cases during fiscal 1970. Id. at 16. Against this record must be balanced the
fact that individual complaints have increased in number to the point where a consid-
erable backlog exists, causing complainants to suffer through a prolonged processing
period. See id. at 29-30.
17. See generally H.R. REP. No. 88-914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
By virtue of the definitions contained in section 701, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964),
the act is restricted in its coverage. Under subsection (b), for example, an employer is
not subjected to the provisions of Title VII unless he employs 25 or more persons. The
definition of "labor organization" is similarly restrictive under subsections (d) and (e).
Section 702, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1964) provides that the title shall not operate "with
respect to the employment of aliens outside any State" or to the policies of religious or
educational institutions in certain situations.
The limits placed upon the powers and jurisdiction of the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission under section 705, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1964), and the proce-
dural restrictions of section 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1964), have further encumbered
implementation of the policies underlying the 1964 act. See note 15 & accompanying
text supra.
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clearly the statute cannot accomplish what the Equal Rights Amend-
ment would. Yet the sex discrimination ban of Title VII has been
and will continue to be important reform legislation. Much pro-
tective legislation has already been declared invalid under Title VII
and the supremacy clause,18 and it may be, that the words of Judge Gray
are slowly coming into phase with underlying economic and social
realities.
The ultimate content of the sex discrimination ban in Title VII is yet
undefined,' 9 but there have been two areas of recent litigation germane
to the definition process. One, argued before the Supreme Court in the
case of Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,20 is the "sex-plus" theory of
defense, attempting to place limits on what constitutes prohibited dis-
crimination under the act. The second area of litigation, also dealt
with in the Phillips case and in a number of recent lower court deci-
sions, is the bfoq exception to Title VII. These two areas, as they
evolve through judicial interpretation, should largely determine the
eventual scope of Title VII's sex discrimination coverage. They com-
prise the subjects for the discussion and analysis to follow.21
The "Sex-Plus" Theory
"If 'sex-plus' stands, the Act is dead.' '2 2  This memorable, blunt
pronouncement was that of Judge Brown in his dissent from the decision
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denying a pe-
tition for rehearing in the Phillips case. The term "sex-plus" was coined
by Judge Brown to describe two-pronged employer practices which do not
18. See Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969);
General Elec. Co. v. Young, - F. Supp. -, 3 FAmI EMp. PRAc. CAS. 560 (W.D. Ky.
June 9, 1971); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969) (com-
pany system restricting women to jobs not requiring lifting more than 35 pounds vio-
lated Title VII).
19. For a comprehensive treatment of developments to date see Developments-
Title VII, supra note 9, at 1109.
20. 400 U.S. 542 (1971), rev'g 411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1969).
21. The Phillips case and the sex-plus theory have been the subject of comment
elsewhere. E.g., Comment, Civil Rights of 1964: An Exception to Prohibitions on Em-
ployment Discrimination, 55 IowA L. REv. 509 (1969); Developments-Title VII, supra
note 9, at 1171-76. The bfoq exception has also received several careful analyses.
E.g., Note, Sex Discrimination in Employment: An Attempt to Interpret Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1968 DuKE L.I. 671; Developments-Title VII, supra note 9,
at 1176-95. To traverse the same ground already worked by the foregoing and other
studies would not be fruitful. However, important recent decisions have occurred, and
developing trends may be more perceptible than heretofore.
22. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 416 F.2d 1257, 1260 (5th Cir. 1969)
(Brown, I., dissenting) (emphasis added).
discriminate solely on the basis of sex, but which embody sex plus some
other neutral factor. This section shall examine the circumstances which
occasioned the "sex-plus" theory and the ramifications of its rejection.
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.
At issue in Phillips was Martin Marietta's policy of declining em-
ployment applications from mothers with preschool age children, without
applying a like rule to fathers with preschool age children. 3 Martin
Marietta's position, accepted at both the district court and appellate lev-
els, was simply that it had not engaged in proscribed discrimination
against Ida Phillips based on sex; indeed, between 75 and 80 percent of
Martin Marietta's employees were female.24 As put by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals: "Ida Phillips was not refused employment because
she was a woman nor because she had preschool age children. It is the
coalescence of these two elements that denied her the position she de-
sired. ' 25  In an opinion written by Judge Morgan, the Fifth Circuit took
a rather rigid view of the position of the EEOC and concluded that a
per se violation of Title VII based on sex had not been established.26
Judge Brown, dissenting from the court's failure to grant a rehearing en
banc, was led to speculate that discrimination would be possible under
the majority's view by adding any token factor to race, sex or other pro-
hibited ground under Title VII. 27  Yet these polemics were not en-
tirely necessary. The Phillips case involved the application of a policy
to one sex only, and this inequality of treatment proved to be the critical
problem.28 What result might have been reached had Martin Marietta's
rule been one of declining employment to anyone, male or female, with
preschool age children is conjectural. Problems of employment policies
neutral on the surface and applied alike to both sexes but having a dis-
23. According to Martin Marietta's brief to the Supreme Court, the company's
policy may not have been as clear as indicated in the lower court decisions. Brief for
Respondent at 5-7, 18-19.
24. This fact was uncontroverted. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., I FAIR
EMP. PRAc. CAS. 363 (M.D. Fla. 1968).
25. 411 F.2d at 4.
26. Id.
27. 416 F.2d at 1260. Perhaps one example of the type of problem Judge Brown
feared was presented in EEOC Decision No. 7090, 2 FAIR EMP. PRAc. CAs. 236 (1969).
There, a Negro applicant for the job of stewardess was rejected, not because of her race,
but because of having, according to the interview form, "unattractive, large lips."
Clearly the commission was correct in disapproving this action. Employers should not
be permitted to single out characteristics which may be prevalent in one race and identify
the absence of that characteristic as a lob qualification.
28. See note 35 & accompanying text infra.
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criminatory effect (such as the example by Judge Brown of a 175
pound minimum weight requirement) were not necessarily raised. 9
Nevertheless, the result reached by the Fifth Circuit was wrong since
the opinion could have debilitated Title VII badly-an unhappy result
not intended by Congress. Contrary to Judge Morgan's statement that
"no helpful discussion is present from which to glean the intent of Con-
gress,130 the sex-plus notion is a rare instance in which the legislative
history is relatively clear.31 On June 15, 1964, Senator McClellan pro-
posed an amendment to Title VII to insert the word "solely" before the
proscribed categories of discrimination.32  Senator Case responded by
stating:
The difficulty with this amendment is that it would render TitleVII totally nugatory. . . . [T]his amendment would place upon
persons attempting to prove a violation of this section, no matter
how clear the violation was, an obstacle so great as to make the
title completely worthless.33
Had Senator McClellans amendment passed, the sex-plus theory would
have been part of the statute-only acts discriminating solely because
of sex would have been unlawful. But the amendment did not pass;
it was defeated by a roll call vote. 34
The Supreme Court disposed of the Phillips case in a concise per
curiam opinion. Vacating and remanding the decision of the court of
appeals, the per curiam opinion stated that under Title VII persons of
like qualifications must be extended equal employment opportunities ir-
respective of sex, and the lower court "therefore erred in reading this
section as permitting one hiring policy for women and another for men--
each having pre-school age children."35 The court then aimed a glanc-
29. These types of problems are now being faced by the EEOC, and a business
necessity test is being fashioned along the lines of the recent decision of Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), which dealt with the racially discriminatory effects of
neutral employment tests which may or may not be job-related.
30. 411 F.2d at 3.
31. It may be that the pertinent congressional history went unobserved in the
Phillips litigation until the case reached the Supreme Court. In its brief to the Su-
preme Court, the EEOC documented the salient congressional events, but no mention
of them was made by the court in its opinion. See Brief for EEOC as Amicus Curiae at
9. Recently at least one circuit court of appeals has made reference to the legislative
history in question. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.
1971).
32. 110 CONG. RPc. 13837 (1964).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 13838.
35. 400 U.S. at 544.
ing blow at the bfoq exception, indicating that the existence of conflict-
ing family obligations, "if demonstrably more relevant to job perform-
ance for a woman than for a man, could arguably be a basis for distinc-
tion under § 703(e) of the Act."36  Since this point had not been de-
veloped in the preceding litigation, the case was remanded for further
consideration.3 7
Ramifications of the Sex-Plus Rejection in Phillips
On the question of whether there was discrimination proscribed un-
der Title VII in the employment policies of Martin Marietta, the result
reached by the Supreme Court is a good one. A policy unequally applied
between the sexes, even if only to subcategories within the respective
sexes, is ordinarily not justifiable. More challenging questions remain,
however. From the standpoint of the act's permissible limits, cases are
cropping up before the EEOC and the courts which test the logical ex-
tensions of the rejection of sex-plus in Phillips. Moreover, the much
more difficult evidentiary problems involved in neutral rules (applied
equally to both sexes) which have discriminatory effects are being liti-
gated. Recently, the EEOC and the courts have begun to approach
these problems.
The Long Hair Cases
In the judgment of the EEOC, an employer's refusal to employ
males with long hair while employing hirsute females is an unlawful
employment practice under Title VII. The argument, akin to that in
Phillips, is that only males with long hair, not males generally, have
36. Id. In a strongly worded concurring opinion protesting the court's offhand
treatment of the bfoq question, Justice Marshall stated: "I fear that in this case, where
the issue is not squarely before us, the Court has fallen into the trap of assuming that
the Act permits ancient canards about the proper role of women to be a basis for dis-
crimination. Congress, however, sought just the opposite result." 400 U.S. at 545. See
notes 110-33 & accompanying text infra for a discussion of the development of the bfoq
in the courts.
37. Martin Marietta did not raise the bfoq defense in the lower courts. However,
the company did indicate in its brief against Phillips's petition for certiorari that if the
case were reversed and remanded it would then advance the bfoq defense "and seek to
support it with the appropriate evidentiary showing." Respondent's Brief in Opposition
to Certiorari at 5 n.2, Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 397 U.S. 960 (1970). See
also Brief for Respondent at 28-29, Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542
(1971).
What evidentiary showing Martin Marietta might have made on remand will not
be known, however; the case was dismissed by order of the district court, pursuant to
stipulation of the parties involved.
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been discriminated against. This argument has not succeeded. Thus,
in the first case of this type decided by the EEOC, no questions of safety
or efficiency were raised, and the EEOC concluded that the "Charging
Party was discriminated against because of his sex by Respondent's un-
equal application of its long-hair policy.""8  In a subsequent decision,
the commission has clearly stated that customer preference is no de-
fense, and the only recourse is for an employer to meet its burden of
demonstrating that its discriminatory hair length policy has a manifest
relationship to the primary function of the job in question. 39
The most recent long hair case to be decided by the commission
dealt with an employer's policy preventing the wearing of beards, mous-
taches and long sideburns. The decision, not surprisingly, was that
"the grooming standard had a foreseeable exclusive impact upon males"
and this was unlawful absent a bfoq showing.40
38. EEOC Decision No. 71-1529, CCH EmT. PRAc. GUIDE 6231, at 4410
(Apr. 2, 1971). What the appropriate remedy would be is yet another question. An
employer cannot cure the discrimination by enforcing a rule against hiring anyone with
long hair-such a rule would probably be discriminatory against women because of a
disproportionate impact on the female sex. Cf. notes 80-102 & accompanying text
infra. The employer must adopt an affirmative hiring policy under which he would hire
members of either sex without regard to hair length.
39. EEOC Decision No. 71-2343, CCH EMP. PRAc. GUIDE 6256 (June 3,
1971). The commission's formulation of the bfoq test in this decision is patterned
after that in Diaz v. Pan American Airlines, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
40 U.S.L.W. 3212 (1971), discussed in some detail hereafter. See text accompanying
notes 116-30 infra.
In the case before the EEOC the employer's policy precluded males from wearing
hair longer "than shoulder length," while requiring only that females comply with cur-
rent "fashion trends." EEOC Decision No. 71-2343, CCH EM. PRAc. GUIDE 6256,
at 4453 (Appended Regional Director's Findings of Fact). These standards had been
established after some number of customer complaints, in an effort to present a favorable
impression to the public so as to avoid conditions that might adversely affect business.
Id. Nevertheless, in light of the narrow role permitted customer preference in the Diaz
decision, this defense was determined by the commission to be inadequate.
40. EEOC Decision No. 71-3003 (July 2, 1971). Because beards are possible
for males only, this situation resembles the question of pregnancy as treated under Title
VII. Pregnancy has been viewed by the commission as a special condition inherently
associated with the female sex and, therefore, invalid as a basis for discrimination. See
EEOC Decision No. 70-495, 2 FAIR Emsn. PRAc. CAs. 499 (1970) (employee health
plan which provided maternity benefits for wives of employees, but not for female em-
ployees was discriminatory); EEOC Case No. YAU 9-026, 2 FAIR Ei.s. PRAc. CAS.
294 (1969) (employer must grant leave of absence for pregnancy); EEOC Commis-
sioner's Decision, LRX 1841 (1966) (pregnancy not a legitimate reason for termina-
tion of accumulated seniority rights).
Logically, too, an analogy can be drawn between pregnancy in the case of a woman
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The hair problem under Title VII has not reached many courts.
The only reported decisions at the time of this writing were two federal
district court cases, Roberts v. General Mills, Inc.,40 a and Dodge v. Giant
Food, Inc.41 In Roberts, General Mills's motion for summary judgment
was denied on the basis of Title VII. Roberts had been discharged be-
cause his hair grew too long to be contained by a hat, and General Mills
required that, to preserve food processing cleanliness, men wear hats and
women wear hairnets. This rule was judged to be of the stereotype
variety precluded by Title VII.4 1a In the Dodge case, Giant Food
Stores utilized different personal appearance rules for males and fe-
males. Males could not have hair "below the earlobe," but females
were subject merely to a requirement that "long hair must be se-
cured and may not fall freely."42  In its brief as amicus curiae in
this case, the EEOC relied on Phillips to show that Giant Food's
"male plus short hair" requirement was impermissible under Title VII.43
However, Judge Green44 found that the grooming regulations were "not
unreasonable," applying to male and female, black and white alike, for
the purpose of insuring a "neat and attractive, well groomed male or
female clerk."45  Without discussion, Judge Green concluded that no
unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII had been shown.4 6  The
judge's point may have been that the composite package of grooming
rules for females (precluding, for example, "off beat" hair styles) was
and military conscription in the case of a man. Certainly, the latter is unique in
America to the male sex. Moreover, it is a condition which for public policy reasons,
is given special treatment; just as the pregnant woman will often be the recipient of ma-
ternity benefits, the veteran receives benefits for having been subjected to the military
"condition" which befalls only members of his sex. Finally, the draft situation involves
a period of defined and predictable duration during which he is rendered unavailable for
employment. In EEOC Case No. 7067, 2 FMR EMP. PRAC. CAS. 167 (1969), the com-
plainant was refused admission into respondent bank's two-year management program
because of his uncertain draft status. The argument was made that, because males only
were subjected to military conscription, the respondent's policy violated Title VII. The
commission found that there was no reasonable cause to believe that the situation
amounted to unlawful sex discrimination. However, the commission expressed the
view that "this is a question of fact to be decided on all of the considerations of a given
case." The decision used the words "not unreasonable," which might indicate a move-
ment toward the "business necessity" standard referred to above. See note 29 supra.
40a. - F. Supp. -, 3 FAm EMP. PRAc. CAS. 1080 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 21, 1971).
41. - F. Supp. -, 3 FAIR EMP. PRAc. CAs. 374 (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 1971).
41a. - F. Supp. at -, 3 FAro EMP. PRAC. CAS. at 1082.
42. Id. at -, 3 FAIR EMP. PRAc. CAs. at 375.
43. Brief for EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 16-17.
44. Interestingly, Judge Green is a woman.
45. - F. Supp. at -, 3 FAro EMp. PRAc. CAs. at 376.
46. Id.
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as stringent in terms of overall neatness and appearance as the com-
posite grooming package for males. Phrased thus, there arguably was
not any unequal treatment based on sex. But the facts in Dodge do not
particularly support such a theory; moreover, Judge Green did not ex-
plicate her ruling. The ruling appears incorrect under Title VII. Hair
length is simply a habit of culture; no functional reason ordinarily ex-
ists to utilize different policies for men and women. Neatness can be
required, to be sure, but this requirement would extend to both sexes.
Phillips was directly on point and should have controlled.
Other long hair actions are pending in the courts;47 it remains to be
seen how they will be decided. Judges frequently refer to the im-
portance of paying deference to the position of the EEOC. 48 Often this
seems ritualistic-if judicial judgments happen to accord with EEOC
positions, deference will be shown. 49  Nevertheless, the long-hair issue
is one as to which the commission's position is sound and should be
accepted by the courts.
Matters of Marriage
The marriage question in airline stewardess cases is fairly well set-
tled. Although two federal district court decisions, Cooper v. Delta
Airlines, Inc.50 and Landsdale v. Air Lines Pilots Ass'n,51 determined
that termination of a stewardess upon her marriage was lawful even
though no similar requirement was utilized for men, both cases were
decided before the Phillips decision by the Supreme Court. One, Lands-
dale, was subsequently reversed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
5 2
47. The EEOC's amicus curiae brief in the Dodge case cited eight cases in prog-
ress in various federal district courts, presenting the long-hair question in a number of
ways. In one action, a preliminary injunction has been issued restraining an employer
from discharging the plaintiffs because of the length of their hair. Diddams v. Univer-
sity Hospitals, CCH EM'. PRAc. GUIDE 1 8244 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 15, 1971).
48. E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971); Phillips v. Mar-
tin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545-46 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
49. See, e.g., Landsdale v. United Air Lines, Inc., 2 FAIR Emp. PRAc. CAs. 461
(S.D. Fla. 1969), vacated, 437 F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 1971); Landsdale v. Air Line Pilot
Ass'n Int'l, 2 FAIR EMP. PRAc. CAs. 461 (S.D. Fla. 1969), rev'd per curiam, 430 F.2d
1341 (5th Cir. 1970); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 1 FAIR EMP. PRAc. CAs. 363
(N.D. Fla. 1968), aff'd, 411 F.2d 1, petition for rehearing denied, 416 F.2d 1257 (5th
Cir. 1969), rev'd, 400 U.S. 542 (1971); Cooper v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 274 F. Supp.
781 (E.D. La. 1967).
50. 274 F. Supp. 781 (E.D. La. 1967).
51. 2 FAIR EMP. PRAc. CAs. 461 (S.D. Fla. 1969), rev'd, 437 F.2d 454 (5th Cir.
1971).
52. 437 F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 1971).
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after the Supreme Court's Phillips decision. Other courts53 and the
EEOC54 are now in accord that a marriage ban cannot be applied only
to women employees, absent a bfoq showing.55
Perhaps the most important sex-plus cases to reach the commission
pertaining to marital status are those involving unwed mothers. In one
case the commission has put the matter unequivocally: "Clearly it would
be an unlawful employment practice to apply an illegitimacy standard to
female applicants only."5  In another dispute concerning a collective
bargaining contract provision limiting leaves of absence for pregnancy to
married females, a union requested that the word "married" be deleted;
the employer's response was: "[T]his is a distinction that is rooted in
morality and not sexual discrimination. '57  The commission disagreed
and, noting the absence of any claim that employees who became fathers
while unmarried would be terminated, found the employer's policy vio-
lated Title VII. 5 s
The EEOC's position in these cases is surely correct. So far, the
53. E.g., Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971).
54. EEOC Case No. 7038, 2 FAR EMP. PRAc. CAS. 165 (1969); Neal v. American
Airlines, Inc., CCH EMP. PRAC. GUIDE 6002 (1968).
55. No case has decided that a "singles only" requirement for women could
amount to a bfoq. In the case of Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th
Cir. 1971), defendant's proof on this question was deemed insufficient to show a bfoq.
444 F.2d at 1199. The point was also argued in Cooper v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 274
F. Supp. 781 (E.D. La. 1967), but the decision did not reach the question. Id. at 782.
The possibility of establishing unmarried status as a bfoq for women employees seems
quite remote. See notes 147-151 & accompanying text infra. Clearly, the EEOC would
not receive such an argument favorably. Cf. Neal v. American Airlines, Inc., CCH
EMP. PRAc. GUIDE 1 6002 (1968).
Likewise, disparate standards for men and women based on age have been rejected
by the commission. Dodd v. American Airlines, Inc., CCH EMP. PRAC. GUIDE 6001
(1968) (rule requiring stewardesses to resign at 32 years of age without a similar policy
for male flight cabin attendants violated Title VH); see EEOC Decision No. 70-145
CCH EMP. PRAc. GUIDE 1 6066 (Sep. 9, 1969) (retail store wrongfully refused to hire
an 18-year old Negro female in a situation where the average age of female workers was
considerably higher than that of male workers).
Of related interest are cases dealing with sex-based differentials in pension and
profit sharing plans. See Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. Co., 2 FAIR EMP. PRAC. CAS. 1090
(D.N.J. 1970); EEOC Decision No. 70-706, 2 FAIR EMP. PRAC. CAS. 684 (1970);
EEOC Decision No. 68-9-183E, CCH EMP. PRAC. GUIDE 6022 (1969).
56. EEOC Decision No. 71-332, CCH EMP. PRAc. GUIDE t 6164 (Sept. 28, 1970).
57. EEOC Decision No. 71-562, 3 FAIR EM1,. PRAc. CAS. 233 (Dec. 4, 1970).
58. Id. at 235. The commission noted that the employer was a government
contractor, and that the Sex Discrimination Guidelines issued by the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance provide in part that: "Any distinction between married and
unmarried persons of one sex that is not made between married and unmarried per-
sons of the opposite sex will be considered to be a distinction made on the basis of
sex." 41 C.F.R. § 60-20.3(d) (1971).
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commission's cases have been disposed of on the basis of an equality
standard. But there is another theory which the commission has used as
a parallel ground for decisions-a notion of "disproportionate impact"
on one sex.50 This theory is linked with the recent decision of Griggs
v. Duke Power Co.60 by the United States Supreme Court, and it has
far-reaching implications. Discussed in detail below,61 the dispropor-
tionate impact test is pertinent here as the basis for a recent unwed
mother decision by the New York Supreme Court. In Cirino v. Walsh,62
the plaintiff was a Puerto Rican with eight illegitimate children by five
different fathers. She was a good employee and had an outstanding
reference from one part-time employer. She sought additional part-
time work as a school crossing guard, but was denied the job because
of a lack of "good character." Quoting from Griggs, Judge Tyler held
that the plaintiff was arbitrarily discriminated against because of both
race and sex. His reasons were remarkably simple, but potent.
If more Puerto Ricans have children out of wedlock than Cauca-
sians, then a refusal of a position on that ground affects them more
and is discriminatory. If the fact of children is more easily discov-
ered about the mother who looks after them than the father who
does not, then it is discriminatory against women.63
Homosexuality
More deeply "rooted in morality" than unwed motherhood is ho-
mosexuality. Whether homosexuals are protected by Title VII from
discrimination in employment because of their personal sexual be-
havior is a question not yet faced by the EEOC or the courts.
The question may come up in various ways, but there are two situa-
tions which may be treated distinctly. First, homosexuality may not be
suspected by an employer. There may be no outward signs, but the
employer in some way may learn of an individual's homosexuality and,
because of this knowledge, alter or terminate the employer-employee
relationship. Secondly, outward behavior characteristics causing a male
to seem effeminate or a female to seem masculine could be offensive to
an employer and the basis for denial of an employment opportunity. In
both of these situations, notwithstanding the delicacy of the problem,
a strong case can be made that discrimination should not be permitted
59. See EEOC Decision No. 71-332, CCH Emi'. PRAc. GurmE % 6164 (Sept. 28,
1970).
60. 401 U.S. 424 (1970).
61. See notes 82-99 & accompanying text infra.
62. 66 Misc. 2d 450, 321 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
63. Id. at 451, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 495.
without a business necessity or bfoq defense.
The second situation is the easier since conceptually the "effemi-
nate male" or "masculine female" question is similar to the long-hair
cases. Very likely an employer who would balk at hiring an effeminate
male would not reject a female applicant with masculine traits.64 If so,
as in the long-hair situations, males have been discriminated against be-
cause of physical characteristics bearing a cultural stigma which at-
taches to males but not to females. Conceivably, an employer could
defend his actions by saying that a lack of effiminacy in males is a matter
of business necessity or a bfoq, but at least a showing of the job-related-
ness of any such rule should be required under Title VII.
The other situation, where an employer's action is not based upon
stereotyped physical traits which he might associate with homosexuality,
is more difficult. Here, it may be assumed that an employer would not
discriminate between males and females but his denial of employment
opportunity would be based simply on the fact of homosexuality.1 The
question then presented is whether the term "sex" as used in Title VII
can be said to encompass homosexual behavior. Certainly such a result
was not envisioned by Congress when Title VII was passed. No one
thought about the question at the time, and the legislative history is not
helpful.
Of interest by way of analogy is a recent case in Minnesota, McCon-
nell v. Anderson.66 At issue was whether, under the Civil Rights Act
of 1871,67 the Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota de-
prived Jim McConnell, a homosexual, of any rights provided him by
the Fourteenth and First Amendments of the United States Constitu-
tion. McConnell had been hired by the regents, but this decision was
retracted after he publicly announced his homosexuality by applying for
a license to marry another man. McConnell brought suit to secure the
job he had been promised. Several important assumptions were first
made by the court. Among them were the following: that no claim
64. This supposition assumes that most persons making personnel decisions will
be male, although perhaps most female employers would harbor the same type of preju-
dice.
65. For purposes of discussion of homosexuality under Title VII, assume, too,
that no question of violation of state statutes dealing with "abnormal" sexual behavior
is presented. Such a question would raise independent issues beyond the scope of the
present analysis. Many state statutes are unquestionably out of harmony with the times.
but the moral cement in which they are embedded remains strong.
66. 316 F. Supp. 809 (D. Minn. 1970).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
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was asserted under the 1964 Civil Rights Act;68 that no attempt had
been made to- show that he was incompetent as a librarian or that "his
homosexual tendencies might affect the performance of his duties or
his efficiency as a librarian";69 and that he would not be in a position
to handle or be exposed to information involving national secur-
ity.7 0
The district court reviewed the state of the law in some detail. Al-
though no case was found to be exactly on point, Judge Neville placed
heavy reliance on two cases from the District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals. 7 ' These decisions held that the Civil Service Commission
was not justified in refusing employment eligibility to an individual be-
cause of "immoral conduct" when the basis for the commission's con-
clusion was an admission of homosexuality and there was no evidence
of any practice of that proclivity. Judge Neville recognized that an indi-
vidual does not have an inalienable right to public employment. 72 But
noting that there was a constitutional right requiring the terms of pub-
lic employment to be "reasonable, lawful, and non-discriminatory," 73
the judge concluded: "IT]o justify dismissal from public employment,
or. . . to reject an applicant for public employment, it must be shown
that there is an observable and reasonable relationship between effi-
ciency in the job and homosexuality. '7 4
Judge Neville may not have meant exactly what he said. Elsewhere
in his opinion, he indicated that no question of national security was
presented, no question was presented of criminal acts by homosexuals,
and no question was presented of exposing the homosexual employee
to children of tender years. Yet none of these considerations would
have a particular bearing on "efficiency in the job." Thus, this test may
68. "The term homosexual is significantly omitted from this statute." 316 F. Supp.
at 812.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Scott v. Macy, 349 F.2d
182 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
72. 316 F. Supp. at 814.
73. Id. at 814-15.
74. Id. at 814. The logical extensions of Judge Neville's conclusion regarding
the constitutional aspects of public employment are troublesome. The Fourteenth
Amendment does not prohibit all forms of discrimination; only discrimination based on
invidious classifications is precluded. But if a lack of job-relatedness is sufficient to
make the discrimination invidious, the Fourteenth Amendment should extend to many
classifications not yet litigated. A person who is not hired because he is overweight
might be capable of efficient job performance, for instance. A long list of like ex-
amples could easily be constructed.
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only be reached after concluding that a variety of other risks or problems
are not present in a given case.' 5
The McConnell case has recently been reversed on appeal.' 5a The
position of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was that, by his de-
monstrative public behavior, McConnell was seeking not merely a job
but a job on his own terms-one of which was to "foist" on his employer
"tacit approval" of McConnell's "right to pursue an activist role in im-
plementing his unconventional ideas concerning the societal status to be
accorded homosexuals."7 5b This concept was viewed by the appellate
court as "socially repugnant" and legally unprotected. Nevertheless, the
court pointed out that
[t]his is not a case involving mere homosexual propensities on the
part of a prospective employee. Neither is it a case in which an
applicant is excluded from employment because of a desire cland-
estinely to pursue homosexual conduct.75c
While the use of the word "clandestinely" instead of "privately" was
unfortunate, the court may have been indicating its willingness to have
upheld the district court had Jim McConnell been a less aggressive-a
less public-individual. If so, notwithstanding the difficulties inherent
in a distinction which turns on how discreet a person happens to be, the
lower court decision in McConnell may still stand for the proposition
that private homosexual behavior which is not shown to be job-related
should not be the basis for preventing a person from gaining public em-
ployment.76  This proposition is reasonable enough. Likewise, it is
reasonable to conclude that the ban on sex discrimination in Title VII
could extend to similar factual patterns in private employment. In
the district court Judge Neville offered the gratuitous observation
that "[tlhe term 'homosexual' is significantly omitted from [Title VII]
75. A recent case in the District of Columbia raised the national security question,
Ulrich v. Laird, Civil No. 203-71 (D.D.C., filed Jan. 26, 1971). Otto Ulrich's security
clearance for government contract work had been revoked because of his admitted
homosexuality and his refusal to respond to certain questions about his private behavior.
Citing Norton v. Macy and Scott v. Macy, note 71 supra, in an order dated September
28, 1971, Judge Pratt ruled that ordinarily an individual has a right under the First
Amendment to keep the details of his sex life private. Further, Judge Pratt concluded
that "where a man has admitted that he is a homosexual and will continue to be one,
there must be proof of a nexus between that condition and his ability effectively to
protect classified information." No such nexus having been found, Mr. Ulrich's security
clearance was ordered reinstated. Thus, even the preliminaries which were referred to
by Judge Neville in McConnell are coming under close judicial scrutiny.
75a. 40 U.S.L.W. 2225 (8th Cir. Oct. 18, 1971).
75b. Id.
75c. Id.
76. The Fourteenth Amendment was the basis for this conclusion in McConnell;
the First Amendment argument was not considered. 316 F. Supp. at 815.
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and thus it is of no assistance to a decision of the case except gen-
erally to indicate to the court the adoption of a national policy by
the Congress against discriminatory hiring and employment practices
and for equal employment opportunities. ' '77 This observation is incon-
clusive. Like pregnancy, homosexuality could be viewed as an indi-
vidual condition sufficiently sex-related to be enveloped by the term
"sex" as used in Title VII.78 Such a conclusion, embellished by special
considerations unique to the homosexual problem of the type men-
tioned by Judge Neville in McConnell, would be appropriate under a
liberal construction of Title VI1 9 and would advance individual rights
in private employment alongside those which are beginning to be af-
firmed by the courts in public employment.
The Problem of Neutral Rules-"Sex-Mins'
Most of the cases currently being dealt with by the EEOC involve
problems which arise out of the impact of so-called "neutral rules".
No discrimination is discernible in these employment practices on their
face; sex and other invidious bases of discrimination have been factored
out or were never present to begin with. Yet discrimination may occur
because of a neutral rule's substantially disproportionate impact on one
sex or the other. By definition this problem occurs as a jurisdictional
concern-whether proscribed discrimination took place-rather than as
a question of exception under the bfoq provision.
The neutral rule problem of sex discrimination has its antecedent
in racial discrimination cases before the commission and the courts. In
Local 189 Papermakers v. United States ° the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a uniformly applied seniority system which had a
much greater impact on blacks than on whites violated Title VII because
"the effect of the standard is to lock the victims of racial prejudice into an
inferior position.""'
This year, the Supreme Court in the acclaimed Grigg s2 decision
has dealt with the neutral rule question. The Court adopted the EEOC's
position that employment tests which are not racially discriminatory on
77. Id. at 812.
78. For a discussion of pregnancy question under Title VII see note 40 &
accompanying text supra.
79. For a discussion of the judicial construction of civil rights legislation see
notes 186-88 & accompanying text infra.
80. 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
81. Id. at 989.
82. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
their face but which have a substantially disproportionate impact on
blacks must be shown to be job-related before they may be used as
employment criteria.8 3 Proving job-relatedness, according to Chief
Justice Burger, centers around a showing of "business necessity."8 4
. The EEOC has employed the rationale of the Griggs case in dis-
approving various neutral employment practices. For instance, in a
recent decision involving an employer's rule preventing employees from
wearing beards or moustaches, the commission not only found sex dis-
crimination but also found race discrimination. 5 Observing that beards
and moustaches may operate as an expression of heritage and racial pride
for black men, the commission concluded that the employer's standard
had a foreseeably disproportionate impact upon Negroes which was im-
properly discriminatory, absent a showing of business necessity. 6
83. Id. at 431. Speaking for the Court, Justice Burger wrote "The Act proscribes
not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory
in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which op-
erates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice
is prohibited." 401 U.S. at 431. More fundamentally, Justice Burger pointed out that
"[wihat is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary
barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis
of racial or other impermissible classification." Id.
84. Id. The term "business necessity" was articulated in Griggs as a defense in
neutral rule situations where unintended discrimination takes place. The EEOC has
picked up the term in its decisions, but the commission has confused matters some-
what by using words from bfoq decisions of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in giving
content to "business necessity." As indicated below (text accompanying note 114
infra), the Fifth Circuit has defined the bfoq in terms of safe and efficient job perform-
ance by women. See Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th
Cir. 1969). In turn the EEOC has indicated that to prove business necessity in a situation
involving a rule having a substantially disproportionate impact on women, an employer
must show "that the policy is so necessary to the safe and efficient operation of his
business as to justify the policy's discriminatory effects." EEOC Decision No. 71-1529,
CCH EMP. PRAC. GumE 6231, at 4411. This statement may be completely sound, but
the business necessity feature of neutral rules involved in determining whether or not
discrimination exists under Title VII should be kept separate from whatever tests are
developed for the bfoq. The business necessity test will be applicable to all areas of
proscribed discrimination. But, the bfoq does not apply to race. Customer preference,
for instance, is wholly inappropriate in racial discrimination situations. Yet, there may
be a limited area in which customer preference can be the basis for a bfoq where custo-
mer preference is central to the employer's business, or perhaps, to the performance of
the job in question. See note 181 & accompanying text infra. Obviously it would not
do to say that customer preference can provide the basis for a business necessity defense
in cases of racial discrimination under Title VII. Other problems of this sort may sur-
face. Consequently, notwithstanding the use by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals of
similar language in defining the bfoq, it seems desirable to keep these two concepts sepa-
rate.
85. EEOC Decision No. 72-3003 (July 2, 1971).
86. Id. at 2.
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Similar reasoning has supported the commission's views with re-
gard to unwed mothers. The commission has observed that, even as-
suming an employer attempts to apply an illegitimacy standard to males
and females equally, the realities of life are such that illegitimate parent-
hood by a male can easily be concealed, but an illegitimate pregnancy
and childbirth generally cannot be."7 Without evidence of business ne-
cessity, such an employment standard has a foreseeably disproportionate
impact on females and is unlawful.88
Another example of a neutral rule disapproved by the commission
is an arbitrary height requirement.8" The commission has said that
without a showing of business necessity, an employer's utilization of a
minimum height requirement of five feet six inches for production jobs
could not stand because of its foreseeably disproportionate impact on
groups protected by Title VII.O Relying upon a recent Supreme Court
decision under the Taft-Hartley Act, NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers,
Inc.,91 the commission has further ruled that the burden of proceeding on
the issue of business necessity lies with the employer.92 This require-
ment seems logical and comports with procedural assumptions under-
lying the Griggs decision.93
87. EEOC Decision No. 71-332 (Sept. 28, 1970). As previously indicated (see
text accompanying note 63 supra), the New York Supreme Court concurs in this view.
See Cirino v. Walsh, 66 Misc. 2d 450, 321 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
88. Cirino v. Walsh, 66 Misc. 2d 450, 321 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
89. EEOC Decision No. 71-1529, CCH Emp,. PRAC. GUME 6231, at 4411 (Apr.
2, 1971).
90. Id. The groups in question were both women and Spanish American males.
The commission noted that 80% of American women were less than 5' 5" tall, and
that while the average heights of Anglo-American males was 5' 7 ", the average
height of Spanish American males was 5' 4h".
91. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
92. EEOC Decision No. 71-332 (Sept. 28, 1970).
93. Reliance on the Great Dane case for burden of proof purposes is not objec-
tionable, although even this aspect of the case has been criticized as having been both un-
necessary and unsupported by precedent. E.g., Janofsky, New Concepts in Interference
and Discrimination Under the NLRA: The Legacy of American Ship Building and
Great Dane Trailers, 70 COLUM. L. Rnv. 81 (1970).
However, before the Supreme Court decided the Griggs case, the EEOC relied on
Great Dane as authority for the "business necessity" requirement in neutral rule situa-
tions. EEOC Decision No. 71-332 (Sept. 28, 1970). To focus on Griggs for the
business necessity requirement is one thing; to focus on Great Dane for that purpose
is quite another. Great Dane wags a tail-a concatenation of Supreme Court deci-
sions evolving the motive standards under section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, such as the "inherently destructive" category of acts dealt with in several
previous decisions. E.g., American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965);
NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965). If acts fall within this category, no amount of
business justification need be listened to by the NLRB. This feature of the "business
Additional topography of the neutral rule cases should appear
soon.94 The potential for litigation and for encompassing somewhat
startling notions is large. By way of illustration, albeit speculative, an
example might be formulated involving the use of arrest records in em-
ployment practices.
In Gregory v. Litton Systems95 the United States District Court for
the Central District of California held that it was an unlawful employ-
ment practice under Title VII for an employer to follow a policy which
refused consideration of applicants with significant arrest records, since
this policy was viewed as having a discriminatory effect against Negroes
as a class without any predictable bearing on job performance. The
holding was carefully limited to arrests not leading to conviction.9"
Given this qualification, the court found
no evidence to support a claim that persons who have suffered
no criminal convictions but have been arrested on a number of oc-
casions can be expected, when employed, to perform less efficiently
or less honestly than other employees. 97
The analogy to the sex discrimination area fairly leaps to mind.
The percentage spread between the number of males arrested and the
number of females arrested is substantially greater than the spread be-
tween blacks and whites.98 It follows, per the Gregory case, that em-
ployer utilization of rules which deny employment opportunities be-
necessity" test may have no bearing on developments under Title VII. Thus, while the
business necessity approach under Griggs and Great Dane are similar, it does not seem
desirable under Title VII to invoke the long, finely wrought history of the motive aspect
of labor discrimination under the Taft-Hartley Act.
94. The staff of the EEOC compliance division estimates that approximately 80
percent of the cases currently being processed fall into this category.
95. 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), appeal docketed, No. 26669, 9th Cir.,
Sept. 9, 1970. This decision has been relied upon by the EEOC as authority for its
disapproval of neutral employment rules which have an unjustifiably disproportionate
impact on a protected group under Title VII. E.g., EEOC Decision No. 71-322 (Sept.
28, 1970).
96. 316 F. Supp. at 402-04.
97. Id. at 402.
98. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Jus-
tice reported in 1967: "One of the sharpest contrasts of all in the arrest statistics on
offenders is that between males and females. Males are arrested nearly seven times as
frequently as females for Index crimes [murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible
rape, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny of $50 and more and motor vehicle theft]
plus larceny under $50. The rate for males is 1,097 per 100,000 population and the
corresponding rate for females is 164. The difference is even greater when all offenses
are considered.
... For Index offenses plus larceny under $50 the rate per 100,000 blacks in
1965 was four times as great as that of whites (1,696 to 419)." PRESIDENT'S COMMIS-
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cause of non-conviction arrest records constitutes a violation of Title
VII because of an unjustifiably disproportionate impact on the male
sex.
99
There is an argument that the race and sex situations are not com-
parable with regard to arrest records. The Gregory case could be based
on the fact that the black population experiences a larger proportion of
arrests which do not lead to convictions than is true of the white popula-
tion. This could be due to a number of factors including the basic
prejudices of white arresting officers.10 But this distinction was not re-
lied upon by the court in the Gregory decision; in fact, the language of
the court is pointedly broad.10' Thus, the argument might stand that
the use in employment practices of nonconviction arrest records involves
inherent sex discrimination as well as race discrimination which should
not be permitted absent a showing of business necessity.10 2
SION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF
CRIME IN A FREE SociETY 44 (1967).
99. The question is of considerable importance since arrest records are widely
used as an employment criterion. Comment, Arrest Records as a Racially Discrimina-
tory Employment Criterion, 6 HARv. Civ. RiGHTs-Civ. Lma. L. REv. 165, 174-75 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Arrest Records]. If the use of arrest records does constitute un-
lawful sex discrimination, the appropriate remedy would be, as in Gregory, to preclude
the use of arrest records altogether as an employment standard. 316 F. Supp. at 404;
Neal v. American Air Lines, Inc., CCH EMp. PRAC. GUIDE ff 6002 (1968). Ideally, if
Gregory were taken to heart by employers, nonconviction arrest records would be rec-
nogized as an arbitrary, unsatisfactory employment standard, and there would be no
need to carry the Gregory analysis from race cases to sex cases. That such a develop-
ment will occur is, to put it mildly, unlikely.
100. The types of crime in question may also have a bearing on the problem. It
has been noted that acquittal rates are higher in crimes against the person (for which
blacks are arrested more often than whites) than in property crimes. See Arrest Rec-
ords, supra note 99, at 69-70.
101. For example, the court dealt with the subject of intent by commenting that
Litton's practice was unlawful, "even if it appears, on its face, to be racially neutral and,
in its implementation, has not been applied discriminatorily or unfairly as between appli-
cants of different races. [Citations omitted]. In a situation of this kind, good faith
in the origination or application of the policy is not a defense. An intent to discrimi-
nate is not required to be shown ....... 316 F. Supp. at 403.
102. One factor in the business necessity test is the importance of whether or not
the employer has a reasonable alternative to the discriminatory practice in question.
E.g., Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. de-
nied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970). EEOC Decision No. 71-1332, CCH EM?. PRAc. GUIDE
1 6212, at 4363-64 (Mar. 2, 1971). Regarding nonconviction arrest records, alternative
criteria may well serve as more reliable indicators of job performance. Recommenda-
tions of previous employers have been regarded as one such indicator. REPORT OF
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE DIsTRIcT OF COLUMrIA 454 (1966), cited in
Arrest Records, supra note 99, at 172.
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The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Exception
The bona fide occupational qualification exception to Title VII
initially pertained only to religion and nationality. The exception was
extended to cover sex by an amendment offered by Representative
Goodell who apparently thought the exception would have wide appli-
cation in sex cases."°3 His fellow congressmen seem to have perceived
of sex as a limited bfoq, because specific examples in the legislative his-
tory are scarce. Senators Joseph Clark and Clifford Case, floor mana-
gers of the Title VII bill, prepared a written memorandum interpreting
the bill in which the following bfoq examples were given: French cook
in a French restaurant, all male professional baseball teams, masseurs,
salesmen of a particular religion for businesses seeking patronage of
particular religious groups, and employees of a particular religion for
religiously affiliated educational institutions.10 4  The examples were em-
bellished and supplemented somewhat in the floor debate.' 05
The following year, a bill was offered to give the EEOC enforce-
ment powers.'0 6 The bill passed the House but died at the end of the
session. In the course of the debate on the house floor, it was made
very clear that the bill would not change Title VII at all with respect
to the bfoq' 07 The House report described the bfoq exception as lan-
103. In offering the amendment, Representative Goodell stated: "There are so
many instances where the matter of sex is a bfoq. For instance, I think of an elderly
woman who wants a female nurse. There are many things of this nature which are
bfoq's, and it seems to me they would be properly considered here as an exception." 110
CONG. REc. 2718 (1964) (emphasis added).
104. Id. at 7212-13.
105. Representative Dent indicated that a French cook in a French restaurant and
an Italian cook in an Italian restaurant would qualify, and pointed out that "there's
nothing wrong with that because [the employer] would hardly be doing his business
justice by advertising for a Turk to cook spaghetti." Id. at 2549. It was then asked
whether this would extend to waiters, cashiers and dishwashers in such a restaurant.
Representative Dent answered that it would not. Representative Dent also gave as an
example bfoq the situation of a Roman Catholic employed as a sales girl in a religious
articles store. Representative Cramer asked why the bfoq exception should apply to
labor unions as well as to employers. Representative Roosevelt answered that it should
be so extended because there are "instances where labor unions that dealt with a particu-
lar language group had to have and had to be able to hire. . . people who were able to
speak the particular language used by the people of a certain national origin." Id. at
2549-50. The debate after this point was not very fruitful due to the confusion on the
part of a number of southern representatives who tended to equate race and national
origin for purposes of the bfoq exception. In a later session, however, Representative
Green suggested that deans of men and women at a university would be further examples
of sex as a bfoq. Id. at 2721.
106. H.R. 10065, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
107. In response to a question by Congresswoman May, Representative Hawkins,
the bill's author, stated that the proposed legislation would in no way change the scope
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guage which
is meant to apply in those rare circumstances where a reasonable,
good faith, cause exists to justify occupational distinctions based on
religion or national origin, or the more common circumstances,
widely accepted by contemporary standards, where a reasonable,
good faith, and justifiable ground exists to perpetuate occupational
distinctions based on sex. 108
This language was tempered by the remarks of Representative O'Hara
to the effect that Congress is not the judge of what are bfoqs: "[T]hat is a
subject to be decided by the Commission and by the courts in the light of
all the evidence presented to them on the particular occupation in-
volved."'1 9  The House report must also be tempered by its ex post
facto nature and by the fact that it deals with a piece of legislation
which did not pass in both houses of Congress.
Development of the BFOQ in the Courts
Much has already been written about the initial shaping of the
bfoq exception in Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. 10 and in other early
decisions."' While that chronology need not be restated here, attention
should be given to later developments in the Fifth and Ninth Circuit
Courts of Appeal.
The Fifth Circuit has been prominent in defining the bfoq because
of its decisions in Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph
Co." 2 and Diaz v. Pan Americanr World Airways, Inc. a3  The Weeks
case, by now widely cited, involved a state statute placing maxi-
mum limits on weight lifting by females. This statute was found insuf-
or effect of the bfoq provision. It was intended simply to facilitate implementation and
enforcement of Title VII by providing the necessary procedural and jurisdictional ma-
chinery. 112 CONG. REc. 9131 (1966).
108. H.R. REP. No. 718, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). This language was relied
upon by counsel for Pan American in the Diaz case, discussed at text accompanying notes
116-29 infra. Brief for Appellant at 31-32, Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3212 (1971). However, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Diaz took no note of the House Report on H.R. 10065.
109. 112 CONG. R c. 9134 (1966). An exchange between Representatives Devine
and Dent concerning airline stewardesses precipitated Mr. O'Hara's remarks, Represen-
tative Dent's position being that female stewardesses would be protected by the bfoq ex-
ception. Id. at 9133-34. Obviously, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed when
the Diaz case was decided. See notes 124-29 & accompanying text infra.
110. 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
111. For histories of the earlier bfoq development see Developments-Title VII,
supra note 9, at 76-86; Note, Sex Discrimination in Employment, An Attempt to Inter-
pret Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1968 DUKE L.J. 671.
112. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
113. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3212 (1971).
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ficient to justify an employer's practice against hiring women in jobs
involving heavy weight lifting. The test articulated by the court was
that
in order to rely on the bona fide occupational qualification excep-
tion an employer has the burden of proving that he had reasonable
cause to believe . . . that all or substantially all women would be
unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job in-
volved.114
That burden not having been carried, the employer's rule relating to fe-
male employees was disallowed." 5
The Fifth Circuit's test of safety and efficiency adapts well to the
state protective law context, but it is inconclusive in other situations.
For instance, safety and efficiency have little to do with customer
preference. Thus, refinement of the test proved to be necessary. The
occasion was the Diaz case.
In Diaz at issue was the stewardess question-the validity of an
employer's rule restricting the position of flight cabin attendant to the
female sex. The defendant, Pan American, secured Dr. Eric Berne,
popularly known for his authorship of Games People Play, to develop
testimony about the psychological impact of female and male flight
cabin attendants on passengers. Dr. Berne testified that an airplane
cabin constituted a "sealed enclave" which creates three typical emo-
tional states: apprehension, boredom and excitement. In Dr. Berne's
opinion, females are better able to deal with each of these states be-
cause of the nature of their psychological relationship as females to per-
sons of both sexes. He particularly emphasized this with regard to the
relief of anxiety of passengers."16
Dr. Berne's testimony was supplemented by evidence of Pan Ameri-
can to the effect that male stewards had been used throughout most of
the airline's history, but had been abandoned in 1959.11 According
to Pan American, the prime function of the cabin attendant job after
the introduction of jets in 1958 was "to provide passengers, so far as
possible, with friendly personalized service, to instill a sense of comfort
and well-being in flight, and to provide maximum reassurance to the
new 'mix' of travellers Pan Am was carrying." ' s In Pan American's
judgment, females performed this job function significantly better than
114. 408 F.2d at 235.
115. Id. at 236.
116. Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 559, 565 (S.D. Fla.
1970).
117. Id. at 562.
118. Id. at 563.
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males." 9 Complicating the picture was the difficulty of isolating by the
interview process those males who would have psychological skills com-
parable to the average female in the context of flight cabin attendant
duties.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Flor-
ida was convinced. Because of the bfoq exception, no unlawful em-
ployment practice under Title VII was found to exist in Pan American's
hiring policies. 2 Two features of the district court's conclusions were
particularly significant. First, the court concluded "that it was not
practically possible to identify in the hiring process those few men" who
possessed the aggregate of personality characteristics which Pan Am
was entitled to seek in its flight attendants.' 21  Secondly, after quoting
from the "Interpretive Memorandum" submitted by Senators Clark and
Case during the debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1964,122 the court
concluded that
[t]he clear import of this legislative history is that customer prefer-
ence can provide a basis for an employer's selecting employees on
the basis of sex where the preference is a legitimate one, related
to differences in the ways in which the work will be performed by
persons of different sexes, and the manner in which such perform-
ance will be received by the customer because of such differ-
ences.
123
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed. 24  Adopting the position
stated by the EEOC in its amicus curiae brief, the court began with
the proposition that the word "necessary" within the bfoq qualification
required the application of "a business necessity test, not a business
119. Id.
120. Id. at 569.
121. Id. at 568. The court acknowledged that there might be situations, unlike
that in Weeks, where individual screening and testing would be nigh impossible. Id.
And, according to the court, it may be that where an employer sustains the burden of
demonstrating that it is impossible or highly impractical to deal with women on an in-
dividualized basis, it may apply a reasonable general rule. Id.
In Gudbrandson v. Genuine Parts Co., 297 F. Supp. 134 (D. Minn. 1968), a bfoq
exception dealing with heavy weight lifting jobs was upheld because, even though some
women could perform the work, "the process of selecting those few who may be able to
do so involves a high risk of danger and inefficiency." Id. at 136. This distressingly
broad test has been the subject of criticism. Developments-Title VII, supra note 9, at
1178 n.60. Similarly, the use in Diaz of an "impracticality" standard is unsettling; to
further the purpose of Title VII, individual testing and screening, absent any other
basis for a bfoq finding, should be required unless virtually impossible.
122. 110 CONG. REc. 7212-13 (1964).
123. 311 F. Supp. at 569.
124. Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3212 (1971).
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convenience test."' 25  Alternatively phrased, "discrimination based on
sex is valid only when the essence of the business operation would be
undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively."' 26  Having
said this, the court decided that "[t]he primary function of an airline is
to transport passengers safely from one point to another," and the attri-
butes of female stewardesses, while important, "are tangential to the es-
sence of the business involved."'1 27
The court of appeals translated the district court's finding that it
was "not practically possible" to identify the few men in the hiring proc-
ess who possessed the aggregate of personality characteristics to which
Pan American was entitled, into a more relaxed finding that the actuali-
ties of the hiring process "would make it more difficult to find these
few males."' 28  Customer preference was treated as a separate ques-
tion. Again following the lead of the EEOC in its amicus curiae brief,
the conclusion was reached that customer preference comes into play, if
at all, only in those situations where the essential nature of the business
is the satisfaction of certain customer preferences.1 29
The Diaz case before the Fifth Circuit could have been resolved
rather easily under the formulation of the bfoq test stated in Weeks.
Clearly it could not have been shown by Pan American that all or sub-
stantially all men could not perform the job of flight cabin attendant
safely and efficiently. Yet the Weeks formulation was insufficient be-
cause it says nothings about customer preference, and the job of flight
cabin attendant is thoroughly laced with customer preference nuances. 130
125. Id. at 388. See Brief for EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 10.
126. 442 F.2d at 388.
127. Id. at 387.
128. Id. Pan American argued vigorously that the district court findings stated a
test not of convenience but of "practical possibility," and that since this finding was not
refuted, it should have been binding on appeal. Brief for Appellant on Petition for Re-
hearing, at 3.
129. 442 F.2d at 389. See Brief for EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 9. In its brief, the
EEOC was addressing that portion of the district court's opinion dealing with the Clark-
Case Memorandum in the legislative history and the bfoq examples given there. To some
extent, the EEOC played word games in suggesting that "the legislative history clearly
indicates that it is not customer preference but business necessity upon which the 'bona
fide occupational qualification' is based." Id. But the commission's point was that cus-
tomer preference is pertinent only when central to the essential nature of the business.
Specifically with regard to the Clark-Case examples, the commission argued that "the
very business of the specialty restaurant is the product of a special ethnic appeal, and
the very business of a religious bookstore, the satisfaction of religious needs." id. at
9-10.
130. Pan American and Dr. Berne argued that customer preference was not a nec-
essary ground for the district court's decision. Brief for Appellant at 26-27 (testimony
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In contrast to Diaz, leaving aside customer preference for the mo-
ment, one other federal court of appeals decision addressing the bfoq
should be mentioned. In Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co.,'31 the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided that physical requirements for
the job of agent-telegrapher on the Southern Pacific Railroad did not jus-
tify the exclusion of the female sex from that job because of a bona fide
occupational qualification. The job in question allegedly required, dur-
ing harvesting season, work in excess of 10 hours a day and 80 hours a
week, heavy physical effort in climbing over and around box cars, and
lifting various heavy objects.13 2  The court cited the customary bfoq
decisions, Bowe and Weeks, but the exact bfoq test formulated in
Weeks was not mentioned. Instead, the court focused on the guidelines
of the commission and concluded that:
Based on the legislative intent and on the Commission's interpreta-
tion, sexual characteristics, rather than characteristics that might, to
one degree or another, correlate with a particular sex, must be the
basis for the application of the BFOQ exception.' 3s
This phrasing of the bfoq test is the most narrow to date, and, while
understandable from the overall objectives of Title VII, it is perhaps
the most difficult to square with the bfoq examples contained in the legis-
lative history.
4
EEOC Guidelines and Decisions
The EEOC guidelines on discrimination because of sex prescribe
a very narrow range of behavior which may be justifiable under the
bfoq exception. 3 ' Except for rare instances where a particular sex
may be required for purposes of authenticity or genuineness, 30 the
thrust of the guidelines is that stereotyped generalizations by employers
in favor of one sex or the other are bad.1' 7  Also disapproved are factors
such as customer preference and the expense, unless unreasonable, of
of Dr. Berne). But in its brief on petition for rehearing, Pan American argued that mak-
ing passengers comfortable and relaxed so that they will use a particular airline was not
merely tangential to the airline's business, but was fundamental. Brief for Appellant
on Petition for Rehearing at 5-6.
131. 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
132. Id. at 1223.
133. Id. at 1225. The test as phrased by the court was initially suggested by
Developments-Title VII, supra note 9, at 1178-79.
134. See notes 103-05 & accompanying text supra.
135. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a) (1971). This range may be even more narrow in
the future; the EEOC General Counsel's Office has indicated that the guidelines are cur-
rently being revised.
136. Id. § 1604-1(a)(2).
137. Id. § 1604.1(a)(1)(ii).
making separate facilities available to another sex.138
In practice, the EEOC has been true to its guidelines, and the bfoq
exception has been given exceedingly sparing content. Several recent
decisions by the EEOC are illustrative.
The commission has ruled that an employer cannot refuse to hire
women as "courier guards" notwithstanding the employer's argument
that risks to the property being protected, and to the women themselves,
would be significant, since working conditions included night hours and
working in unlit areas in and around banking facilities.' 39 The fear
that banking customers would cease using the courier service once fe-
male guards were on the payroll was also disregarded by the commis-
sion. This latter argument, according to the EEOC, "presumes that cus-
tomers' desires may be accommodated even at the price of rendering
nugatory the will of Congress. '14"
In two instances, the commission has ruled that employers have
failed to carry their burden of proof when they attempted to show that
unreasonable expense would be incurred to provide separate facilities
for women. One case involved a female welder with eighteen years of
experience who applied for work in a welding yard which had accom-
modated females during World War II and still had surplus water and
sewage lines which could be reactivated. 14' The other presented the is-
sue of how to work the logistics of male and female crew members
aboard freight and passenger vessels operated by a maritime cargo and
passenger carrier.142 Coast Guard regulations require adequate separate
toilet and shower facilities for crew members of different sexes. Even
so, the commission concluded that logical and reasonable solutions on
board could be worked out, depending on the size of the female comple-
ment, so that there was "no persuasive evidence which would war-
rant application of the bona fide occupational qualification excep-
tion under. . . Title VII to the maritime industry."'143
Two additional recent bfoq rulings by the commission are note-
worthy. An employer's policy of refusing to consider male applicant
for nursing positions was disapproved even though three-fourths of the
138. Id. §§ 1604.1(a)(1)(iii), (iv).
139. EEOC Decision No. 7011, 2 FAIR EMP. PRAc. CAS. 118 (1969).
140. Id. at 119.
141. EEOC Decision No. 70558, 2 FAIR EMP. PRAc. CAS. 538 (1970).
142. EEOC Case Nos. NY6-11-144, NY6-11-144U, 2 FAIR EMP. PRAc. CAS. 296
(1969).
143. Id. at 297. The commission did acknowledge that male and female crew
members need not be berthed together, although reasonable allocation of space would
generally avoid any such problem.
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employer's patients were females.'44 Relying on both the Weeks and
Diaz cases,' 45 the commission concluded that the employer could not
act lawfully based on prejudice of its female patients unless it was able
to show not only that all or nearly all of its patients shared the preju-
dice, but also that the prejudice was such as to make it impossible for
all or nearly all male nurses to perform the essential elements of the
nursing profession. 146
The other recent decision dealt with the delicate question of how
sex enters into the hiring of over-the-road truck drivers who work long
hauls in team assignments.' 47  The employer's policy was to refuse to
hire qualified females unless they were married and their husbands were
also employed as truck drivers in the same company. Again relying
on Weeks and Diaz, the commission stated that the employer must sus-
tain the burden of showing that all or substantially all single women
would be unable to perform safely and efficiently as truck drivers, and
that the essence of the employer's business operation would be under-
mined by not hiring single females. 4 The employer did not sustain
this burden; his argument was based largely on moral grounds. To
this the commission responded:
We need not decide the question of whether as a general matter an
employer's private standards of morality or public standards of mo-
rality are a lawful basis for invoking the narrow bona fide occupa-
tional qualification exception ...because it would appear that
Respondent's morality standards are easily accommodated by Re-
spondent's exercising its option to assign a single female to work
with another female, married or single.' 49
Further, citing Griggs and another of its own decisions, 50 the commis-
sion added that "since there is a reasonable alternative available to Re-
spondent which avoids the disproportionate impact of its present stand-
144. EEOC Decision No. 71-2410 (June 5, 1971).
145. See notes 112-30 & accompanying text supra.
146. EEOC Decision No. 71-2410 at 2 (June 5, 1971).
147. EEOC Decision No. 71-2048, CCH EM". PRec. GumE 6244 (May 12,
1971).
148. Id. at 4432. That public morality can be the basis of a bfoq is surely correct.
The most common illustration is the job of restroom attendant. Anyone touring Europe
observes that either sex can perform this job equally well in restrooms of the opposite
sex yet standards of morality in this country are undoubtedly such that the female sex
would be a bfoq for the occupation of restroom attendant in a women's restroom, and
vice versa. However, the categories of jobs in which this type of moral impasse will
be encountered are few; the problem is more theoretical than real.
149. EEOC Decision No. 71-2048, CCH EML. PRAc. Gumi 6244, at 4432 (May
12, 1971).
150. EEOC Decision No. 71-1332, CCH Em. PRAc. GumE 6212 (Mar. 2, 1971).
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ards, continued use of the latter is unlawful." '151
Proving the BFOQ
Constructing convincing proof of a bfoq based on sex is no
small challenge. Pan American made an heroic effort in Diaz but
failed. Others have failed before, and others will henceforth.'5 2
The trend is distinctly toward individual testing of each individual
on his or her own capabilities. Fundamentally, this is what the sex dis-
crimination ban of Title VII is about. After all, women have been sub-
jected to protestations, medical and otherwise, inhibiting their emer-
gence as persons with individual capabilities for quite a long time. Dur-
ing the last century, considerable medical testimony existed to the effect
that women were physically too frail to undergo the experience of a col-
lege education.' 5 3 To contemporary society, that medical proposition
is preposterous, and no doubt many of the cases currently being de-
cided in which proof of a bfoq is attempted will seem foolish in retro-
spect years hence.
A fascinating example of the failure of proof of a bfoq in an area
long considered sacrosanct to males was decided by the New York Su-
preme Court earlier this year in New York State Division of Human
Rights v. New York-Pennsylvania Professional Baseball League.5 4
Baseball umpires in the minor leagues in New York and Pennsylvania
are required to be approved by the Baseball Umpire Development Pro-
gram. That program in turn establishes qualifications for umpires
which include an age limit of 35, minimum height of 5'10", minimum
weight of 170 pounds, and graduation from high school and from an
151. EEOC Decision No. 72-3003 (May 12, 1971).
152. A notable example of attempted proof of sex as a bfoq is found in Cheat-
wood v. South Cent. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 303 F. Supp. 754 (M.D. Ala. 1969). There,
the question was the application of the bfoq exception to the telephone company's job of
commercial representative, which involved heavy duties of rural canvassing, bill collect-
ing and occasional lifting. Considerable medical testimony was taken by the court
concerning the differences between male and females. Both medical experts agreed
that there were genetic and musculoskeletal differences between the sexes which
meant that men can perform greater amounts of heavy work for longer periods of time
than women. The telephone company's witness did not estimate the percentage of
women who could perform the job in question, although he did indicate that there
would be some who could do so. The plaintiff's witness estimated that 25-50% of the
female sex could perform the job. The testimony of the plaintiff's witness was credited
by the court, and, under the Weeks test, no bfoq was found to exist. Id. at 760.
153. E.g., E. CLARKE, SEX IN EDUCATION (1873) (education of women claimed to
weaken their reproductive capacity and to be dangerous to the race).
154. 36 App. Div. 2d 364, 320 N.Y.S.2d 788 (1971).
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approved umpire school. Not surprisingly, the complainant, a woman,
failed to meet the height and weight requirements. Testimony was
given in the case that the various qualifications were "born of the judg-
ment of men with long experience in professional baseball," and that
the standards were required in order to command the respect of big
men, to cope with increased size of professional baseball catchers, to deal
with the possibility of confrontation with large athletes, and to overcome
the physical strain of arduous travel conditions and lengthy games. 155
The court found these standards to be inherently discriminatory against
women and insufficient to sustain a bfoq exception, particularly in light
of the fact that male umpires were occasionally employed who weighed
less than 170 pounds or who stood shorter than 5'10".
Insurmountable difficulties of proof would have characterized Mar-
tin Marietta's position in the Phillips decision on remand had the case
not been settled. There would have been some generalizations available
concerning the importance of maternal care for preschool age chil-
dren,156 and there might have been a slight statistical edge in the com-
pany's favor.15 7  But the evidence could not be other than indecisive.
There are too many variables and too many instances of successful fe-
155. Id. at 396, 320 N.Y.S.2d 793-94.
156. For example, one study for the National Institute of Mental Health begins
with the sentence: "Of all the duties usually expected of the mother, the care of her pre-
school children is considered the most crucial." Nye, Perry & Ogles, Anxiety and Anti-
Social Behavior in Pre-School Children, in F. NYE & L. HOFFMAN, THE EMPLOYER
MOTHERS IN AMERICA (1963). It has also been suggested that: "When there are pre-
school children in the home, most women choose to focus their identity in the home at
the center of the family. These women are more likely to assess their marriage as happy
than are women who choose the labor market." Orden & Bradburn, Working Wives
and Marriage Happiness, 74 Am. J. Soc. 392, 402 (1969).
157. A recent study by the Department of Labor indicated that: "Among 'ever
married persons,'. . . there were more days of sick absence for women (6.1 days) than
men (4.7 days) when compared by the total age-adjusted data as well as by individual
age groups. It was thought that women's greater responsibility for child rearing and
probably their lesser dependency on their own jobs for economic support might explain
the relatively higher sick absence of the 'ever married woman."' WAGE AND LABOR
STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T oF LABOR, FACTS ABouT WOMEN'S ABSEN-
TEEIsM AND LAiOR TuRNovER 5 (1969).
Even more to the point is a relatively recent Public Health Services analysis which
was referred to and quoted from in Martin Marietta's brief to the Supreme Court in
the Phillips case. The study concluded that women with children were more likely to
have a higher frequency of absences than women in other categories. "This observa-
tion supports the contention that women's commitment to the family constellation re-
sults in higher frequencies of absence. Mothers are, at least theoretically, more often
faced with role conflict than are women without children. Thus, the roles of worker
and mother come into conflict, and the result is the dominance of the mother role with
the worker role supported by recourse to absence behavior." Backhenheimer, Demo-
male employees with preschool age children to permit generalizations
under the colors of the bfoq.15 s
What is Left of the BFOQ
Most of the contemporary cases presenting bfoq questions fall into
three areas: those dealing with protective laws, those raising problems
of social mores or morality, and those involving the preferences of con-
sumers or co-workers. The protective law problem has produced a
rather large wave of cases striking down state legislation. Although
there may be some cause for concern over the haste with which this is
being accomplished and the frequent lack of solid data to support the
results reached,1"9 many of the protective laws are in varying degrees
obsolete and unsupportable under Title VII.
A good current example representative of the protective law cases is
the California decision in Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby."' In a carefully
worded opinion, the California Supreme Court held that the state statute
preventing women from becoming bartenders was invalid not only un-
der Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but also under the state
graphic and Job Characteristics and Variables in Absences for Illness, 83 PUB. HEALTH
REPORTS 1029, 1031 (1968), quoted in Brief for Appellee at 28-29 n.4, Phillips v. Mar-
tin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
158. One important variable is the availability of day care centers for the children
of working mothers. The establishment and support of such centers has been given a
high priority by the federal government. See 33 Fed. Reg. 10026 (1968) (Work In-
centive Program regulations providing vocational training to mothers who are receiving
or who might in the future receive public assistance and providing day care centers for
their preschool children).
In his 1969 Address to the Nation on Domestic Programs, President Nixon stated:
"As I mentioned previously, greatly expanded day-care center facilities would be pro-
vided for the children of welfare mothers who choose to work. However these would be
day-care centers with a difference. There is no single idea to which this administra-
tion is more firmly committed than to the enriching of a child's first five years of life,
thus helping lift the poor out of misery, at a time when a lift can help out the most.
Therefore, these day-care centers would offer more than custodial care; they would also
be devoted to the development of vigorous young minds and bodies. As a further divi-
dend, the day-care centers would offer employment to many welfare mothers them-
selves." 5 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1108 (Aug. 11, 1969).
Surely it is not the office of the bfoq to frustrate these efforts through rules such as
that utilized by Martin Marietta in its employment practices. The federal government
has stated its position clearly with regard to such rules where government contract work
is involved. The OFCC guidelines state: "[A]n employer must not deny employment
to women with young children unless it has the same exclusionary policies for men
." 41 C.F.R. § 60-20.3(d) (1971).
159. The concern in this regard has generally addressed the area of maximum hour
laws. See note 2 supra.
160. 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
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and federal constitutions. 161  Showing "great deference" to the guide-
lines of the EEOC, and relying upon the Bowe and Weeks cases, among
others, the California court held that the bfoq exception was inappli-
cable.162  The state's chief argument was that a bartender must be
physically strong in order to protect himself against inebriated cus-
tomers-an ability which women as a class did not have. Observing
that "the saloon days of the Wild West" were no longer in existence, the
court found no evidence that "substantially all women" would be unable
to deal with the problem raised by the state.' 63
The real issue in the state protective law area is whether a state's
statutory generalizations about its residents for purposes of employment
should be treated any differently than an employer's generalization re-
flected in rules or policies. A pair of Ohio cases, one state '6  and one
federal, 66 illustrate contrasting positions on this issue. Under consider-
ation in both cases was an Ohio statute preventing women from engag-
ing in frequent or repeated lifting of weights over 25 pounds.' 66 In
the state case, Jones Metal Products Co. v. Walker, 67 the Ohio Court
of Appeals perceived plaintiffs argument as a contention that "each
female employee should be in some manner individually tested to deter-
mine whether or not she is capable of lifting weights over some limit."' 68
But, according to that court, if plaintiffs argument were accepted the
effect would be to write the bfoq out of the Civil Rights Act.169 Sex
could never be the basis for classification, but classification would al-
ways be based on individual ability. Moreover, the burden of proof is
on the plaintiff with regard to a state statute and as opposed to a private
employment policy where the burden shifts to the employer. 70
161. The bartending problem raised questions as to the applicability of the Twenty-
first Amendment of the United States Constitution. Judge Peters was able to resolve
these questions without difficulty, despite the fact that a federal district court in Cali-
fornia had earlier held the Twenty-first Amendment applicable and had supported the
statute's continued validity. Compare id. with Krauss v. Sacramento Inn, 314 F. Supp.
171 (E.D. Cal. 1970).
162. 5 Cal. 3d at 14, 485 P.2d at 537, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
163. Id.
164. Jones Metal Prods. Co. v. Walker, 25 Ohio App. 2d 141, 267 N.E.2d 814
(1971).
165. Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
166. OHIo RaV. CODE ANN. § 4107.43 (Page 1965).
167. 25 Ohio App. 2d 141, 267 N.E.2d 814 (1971).
168. Id. at 156, 267 N.E.2d at 823.
169. Id.
170. "Where there is a statutory determination that sex is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of a particular type of busi-
ness or enterprise, the person challenging the reasonableness of such determination must
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
reached a different judgment with regard to the same statute in Ridinger
v. General Motors, Corp.171 The Ohio Court of Appeals dccision was
acknowledged, although in the district judge's opinion, the state court
had been influenced by the fact that an employer instead of a female
employee had been challenging the validity of the Ohio statute.1 72 Not-
ing that the state court of appeals opinion contained no discussion of
either the Bowe or the Weeks case, the district court concluded "that
the state court in the Jones Co. case failed to give proper consideration
to the narrow construction given the occupational qualification excep-
tion by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the fed-
eral courts."' 1 73  Accordingly, the district court concluded that compli-
ance with the state statutes pertaining to weight lifting would not con-
stitute a valid defense to an otherwise established unlawful employment
practice violative of Title VII.174
Even though there is a logical appeal to the language used by the
Ohio Court of Appeals in the Jones Co. case, the result reached was un-
sound under Title VII, and the federal district court was correct to
have disagreed. In general, the protective law problem is relatively well
taken care of by the Weeks test. Thus, under the facts of the Jones Co.
case, it could not have been shown that all or substantially all women
could not have performed work involving lifting weights greater than 25
pounds. Or, accepting the burden of proof, the plaintiffs could have
easily demonstrated that a significant portion of women can lift greater
than 25 pound weights without adverse effect. All women who have
been mothers of small children can attest to this fact.
Also, the Weeks formulation should take care of the type of situa-
tion presented in the Phillips case. Questions involving the ability of fe-
males to perform a job without excessive absenteeism, turnover or acci-
dealing with social mores and customer or co-worker preference re-
dent risks are easily tested against a "safe and efficient" job performance
standard.
offer evidence to prove the unreasonableness of such determination. On the other hand,
where the employer makes such determination and establishes the qualification, he must
offer evidence to prove the reasonableness of the determination." Id., citing Phillips
v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
171. 325 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
172. Id. at 1096-97.
173. Id. at 1097. This view has also been endorsed by the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Ohio. Rinehart v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., - F. Supp. -,
3 FAIR EMP. PRAC. CAS. 851, 853-54 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 1971).
174. 325 F. Supp. at 1097.
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Apart from the protective law and Phillips types of problems, cases
main.175 These are situations where a particular sex is at most reason-
ably necessary to job performance. 176  The jobs might involve a need
for authenticity and genuineness in a business (actors and actresses) or
the individual preferences of customers and co-workers (all male base-
ball teams; stewardesses). Also, there are numerous jobs invoking
deeply ingrained social mores (restroom attendants, masseurs and mas-
seuses for persons of the opposite sex, male nurses for female patients,
models, escorts, athletic trainers, sales persons dealing in intimate ap-
parel and the like).
Not all of these examples of jobs in which sex is "reasonably neces-
sary to job performance" are determinable satisfactorily under the
Weeks, Diaz or Rosenfeld tests. Weeks is the least helpful. Generally
no questions of safety or efficiency are present. Rosenfeld provides an
answer for most cases, since, by definition, virtually all of these examples
depend on characteristics which correlate with a particular sex, rather
than upon sexual characteristics themselves. But to say the bfoq is not
applicable to all of the "reasonably necessary" examples is a dramatic
step-a step which clearly conflicts with the examples given in the legis-
lative history. 177  Such a position is uncomfortably extreme. Some
heed must be paid to the elusive concept of congressional intent.' 78
The Diaz test is the most workable. Flexibility is provided in de-
termining what the essence of the employer's business is. How this
question is answered will, as a practical matter, often decide the case.179
175. There is another category about which there is no argument-those rare in-
stances in which a particular sex is a bfoq because it is absolutely necessary to job per-
formance. Examples are wet nurses, sperm donors, or topless waitresses. These exam-
ples obviously pertain to a miniscule portion of the job market.
176. Several examples were given in Congress which would qualify in this category.
See notes 103-105 & accompanying text supra.
In Utility Workers Local 246 v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 320 F. Supp. 1262 (C.D.
Cal. 1970), the "reasonably necessary" category was discussed. Examples given were
Chinese waiters and waitresses in a Chinese restaurant, and actors and actresses playing
male and female roles respectively. Id. at 1265. Dame Judith Anderson's portrayal of
Hamlet was cited as an example of the fact that sex may be only "reasonably necessary."
Id. at 1265 n.1.
177. See notes 103-05 & accompanying text supra.
178. For a discussion of the interpretation of the legislative history of civil rights
statutes see notes 186-87 & accompanying text infra.
179. This flexibility, while desirable, carries with it the risk of abuse. Because of
this fact, it must be monitored by the courts as carefully as possible. An example of the
type of abuse risked might be drawn from the Taft-Hartley Act emergency strike provi-
sions which cannot be invoked without a finding that a substantial portion of an in-
dustry is affected by a strike to the detriment of the national security. Labor-Manage-
In this respect, the Fifth Circuit opinion in Diaz may be faulted some-
what. To phrase the test as the essence of the employer's entire busi-
ness removes the bfoq from specific job-relatedness and fuzzes the inquiry,
particularly where a business may be diversified. It is true that the bfoq
refers to a condition reasonably necessary to the normal operation of a
particular "business or enterprise."'8 °  But, it is an occupational quali-
fication which is being defined, and it is appropriate to investigate the
necessity for a particular sex to perform a particular job. The Diaz
test, accordingly, should be refined to examine the essence of the em-
ployer's business as reflected in the job under consideration.
Customer preference, although stated by the Fifth Circuit Court as
a separate issue, will be involved in the process of deciding what the es-
sence of the employer's business is as reflected in a particular occupa-
tion.'' If the central function of the business is to make retail sales
and the job is selling lingerie, customer preference could be properly
considered to be central to the business as reflected in that job, and the
bfoq exception might well apply. But, if the business is providing
nursing care to sick patients and the nursing position is not limited to
the care of female patients, customer preference may not be so central,
and the bfoq exception could appropriately be held inapplicable.
The last example given, nursing, illustrates the degree to which
many cases will be inextricably interwoven with social mores. There is
no functional reason why female nurses are accepted in the performance
ment Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 208, 29 U.S.C. § 178 (1964). The courts
have tended under this provision to define the term "industry" as narrowly as may be
required to reach the desired result. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. United States, 372
F.2d 922 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1036 (1967) (the "military aircraft
industry," as opposed to the "civilian aircraft industry"); United States v. United
Steelworkers, 202 F.2d 132 (2d Cir.), cert. denied in advance of judgment of the 2d
Cir., 344 U.S. 915 (1953) (shutdown of a manufacturer of "heat exchange shells" for
atomic bombs held not to affect a substantial part of the "heat exchanger, pressure
vessel, and prefabricated pipe industry," but to affect, instead, a substantial portion of
the atomic weapon industry).
To a certain extent, this definitional looseness was present in the Diaz case. Pan
American argued forcefully that its business, when dealing with stewardesses, was more
than transporting passengers safely. Brief for Appellee, Diaz v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3212 (1971).
180. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2(e) (1964).
181. The district court in the Diaz case was correct in saying that the Clark-Case
Memorandum examples showed customer preference as a valid ingredient of the bfoq.
While finespun theories other than customer preference might be fashioned to justify
the existence of an all male baseball team, a French cook in a French restaurant, and a
salesman of a particular religion, customer preference is at the core of these examples,
and Senators Clark and Case were certainly mindful of this fact. The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals avoided this problem by not discussing it.
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of intimate duties with male patients when the reverse is rarely true.
Yet judges must deal with these problems; an integral feature of a judge's
task is the care and manipulation of social mores. As put by Cardozo:
You may say that there is no assurance that judges will interpret
the mores of their day more wisely and truly than other men. I am
not disposed to deny this, but in my view it is quite beside the point.
The point is rather that this power of interpretation must be
lodged somewhere, and the custom of the constitution has lodged
it in the judges. If they are to fulfill their function as judges, it
could hardly be lodged elsewhere.' 8 2
The Diaz formulation of the bfoq test, modified by the refinement
suggested above, comprises a workable vehicle with the means to handle
the question of social mores under Title VII. It does so, moreover,
without requiring complete inattention to the legislative background
against which the bfoq rests.
Conclusion
Perhaps the most basic and most frequently invoked of the many
tenets of statutory construction is that a statute should be interpreted in
light of and in furtherance of the underlying purpose for which the
legislation was enacted.183 Justice Holmes put the matter succinctly:
"[t]he general purpose is a more important aid to the meaning than
any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down."'18 4
On the other hand, the words of the statute are there and they
cannot be given too long a leash. To borrow Justice Frankfurter's
words, "judges are not unfettered glossators."'81 5 Somewhere in support
of the statutory purpose but within an interpretive range which does not
impose undue violence on the words of the statute lurks the objective.
Often it is a moving target, especially as time passes and social condi-
tions and attitudes become rearranged.
Title VII, as is true of civil rights statutes generally, is a remedial
piece of legislation.' 6 Accordingly, it is deserving of a liberal construc-
tion and wide range of permissible interpretation in support of its under-
lying purpose.' A good formulation of the fundamental goal of Title
VII is that articulated in the Griggs case: "What is required by Con-
182. B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JuDIciAL PROCESS 135-36 (1921).
183. See, e.g., Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
COLUM. L. REv. 527, 538-39 (1947).
184. United States v. Whitridge, 197 U.S. 135, 143 (1905).
185. Frankfurter, supra note 183, at 534.
186. 3 J. SUT~HELAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 7217, at 174-75
(Supp. 1971).
187. Id.
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gress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the
basis of racial or other impermissible classification." ' 81 Viewed in this
light, nice distinctions such as the sex-plus theory advanced in the Phil-
lips case cannot stand. Likewise, Title VII should be taken to deal
with developing sex-related problems of society, such as unwed mother-
hood or homosexuality, which continue to be the basis for employment
discrimination, as well as with the manifold ramifications of neutral rules
which effect and perpetuate varying degrees and types of discrimination.
For the same reasons, the bfoq must be dealt with gingerly. As
an exception to a civil rights statute, it automatically should be viewed
suspiciously.189 That offhand speculation which took place in congres-
sional floor debate about what might constitute a bfoq means very lit-
tle.' 90 The examples given in the committee report and the Clark-Case
Memorandum are more significant.' 9 ' But even they must not be per-
188. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
189. E. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES § 299, at 610 (1940).
190. The floor debates in the House of Representatives should be approached cau-
tiously. For years the prevailing view of the courts was that the remarks of individual
members of the legislature were "inadmissible as an aid in construing the statute." 2 J.
SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5011, at 500 (3d ed. 1948).
This refusal to admit such remarks was based upon the subjectivity and personal in-
terpretation which each member would interject into his statements. Another factor was
the ignorance of most members on any given piece of legislation. The expertise and
knowledge which a committee theoretically has at its disposal will usually be lacking in
the membership as a whole. Floor consideration of the bfoq provision was certainly not
indicative of common agreement among the House membership. If it showed anything,
it pointed out the confusion which surrounded the matter. Not only was the scope of
the exception left in doubt, but a number of Congressmen were sufficiently confused to
include race as one of the permissible types of discrimination. 110 CONo. REC. 2554-55
(1964). "Although generally entitled to little weight, the value of such [debates]
should depend upon how well informed their author appeared to be and how well he
seemed to represent the views of his colleagues." 2 J. SUTHERLAND, supra, § 5011, at
502. Applying this principle to the bfoq question, the debate is of very limited value.
191. Committee reports are generally regarded as more reliable and more valuable
indicia of congressional purpose than are the remarks of individual legislators made dur-
ing floor debate. E. CRAWFORD, supra note 189, §§ 213-16, at 375-86. Compare 2
J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 190, § 5005 with id. § 5011. This is understandable in light
of the fact that such reports are made by those groups whose function is to investigate,
evaluate, and recommend to the legislative membership. Reports are issued to explain
the legislation being proposed. However, the value of the particular committee report on
the bfoq and its application to sex discrimination lies only in the analogy drawn from its
treatment of religion and national origin. At the time the report was issued, sex was not
forbidden as an employment criterion. Nevertheless, the analogy can be drawn, in light
of the subsequent addition of sex and the sex bfoq. Despite its shortcomings, this report
is probably the most reliable of the available legislative sources. The report's treat-
ment of the bfoq exception is very restrictive; the exception was originally intended for
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mitted to obfuscate Title VIl's central message-that artificial, arbitrary
and unnecessary barriers to employment which are wrongly discrimina-
tory must be eliminated. Representative O'Hara was surely correct in
1965 in his statement that what is a bfoq is "to be decided by the Com-
mission and by the courts in light of all the evidence presented to them
on the particular occupation involved."' 92
Nevertheless the bfoq should not be read entirely out of the act.
Its adoption and application to sex discrimination by Congress was not
frivolous; the exception was designed to do more in sex discrimination
cases than deal with those isolated instances in which sexual character-
istics make it absolutely necessary for sex to be a bfoq. For these
reasons the Weeks and Diaz formulations of the bfoq test have been
discussed at some length. With some refinements, and within their
contexts, those tests have been judged to be workable means to imple-
ment the bfoq exception in a manner harmonic with the central message
of Title VII and, accordingly, beneficial to persons aggrieved by the
discriminatory conditions which Title VII was drafted to eliminate.
use in rare circumstances. Statements, whether by special memoranda or otherwise,
by floor managers of a bill are comparable to committee reports. 'These statements
are in the nature of supplemental committee reports and are entitled to the same weight.
[I]f in the course of debate on a bill a change is made in its wording, the
statement of the member suggesting the amendment is accepted by the courts as a
legitimate aid to determine the meaning of the amendment." 2 J. SUTHELAm, supra
note 190, § 5012, at 504.
192. 112 CONG. R c. 9134 (1965).

